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THE INADMISSIBILITY OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICAL
STANDARDS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AFTER
HIZEY v. CARPENTER
Marc R. Greenough
Abstract: In Hzey v. Carpenter, the Washington Supreme Court became the only court
of last resort to prohibit introduction of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Professional Conduct as evidence of an attorney's common law duty of care in an
action for legal malpractice. This Note examines the Hizey decision and argues that the
court should not create a preferential standard for attorneys. Instead, the court should
admit professional ethical standards as evidence in legal malpractice actions on the same
basis that the court admits statutes, ordinances, and administrative rules in other actions
for negligence.
Gordon and Jessie Hizey invested in a parcel of commercial real
property in Skagit County in 1968.1 When they decided to sell the
land in 1983, the bank officer negotiating the purchasers' assumption
of the Hizeys' outstanding loan on the property insisted that the
Hizeys remain obligated under the loan.2 The bank officer recom-
mended her husband, Timothy Carpenter, as a real estate lawyer to
draw up a joint venture agreement.' Subsequently, in order for the
purchasers to obtain construction financing to develop the property,
Carpenter drafted an agreement converting the executed joint venture
agreement into a limited partnership.
The purchasers went bankrupt in 1986, preventing the Hizeys from
recovering more than a fraction of their interest in the property.4
Having lost their retirement nest egg, the Hizeys sued Carpenter for
malpractice. They claimed that he represented both the buyers and
the sellers when he drafted the documents. In addition, the Hizeys
claimed that Carpenter was negligent when he failed to advise them to
obtain independent counsel until after he converted their creditor
interest to an equity interest under the limited partnership agreement.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all facts are taken from Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251,
254-57, 830 P.2d 646, 648-50 (1992).
2. The bank officer considered most of the members of the purchasers group less than
creditworthy. Id. at 255, 830 P.2d at 649.
3. Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum at 2, Hizey (Wash. Super. Ct. Skagit County filed Jan. 4,
1990) (No. 87-2-00261-9).
4. The Hizeys sold the property for $950,000 and gave the purchasers a $270,000 credit
against the price for assuming the outstanding loan. Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 255, 830 P.2d at
649. In bankruptcy court the Hizeys eventually settled for $300,000. The court awarded the
Hizeys $150,000; they netted approximately $99,000. Id. at 256, 830 P.2d at 649.
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At trial, Carpenter moved to exclude the testimony of the Hizeys'
expert witness on the ground that it would be improper to admit evi-
dence regarding the professional ethical standards governing attor-
neys.5 The trial court agreed and ruled that the expert could not refer
to specific rules, testify as to the existence of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) or the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), or
testify that the CPR or the RPC established the duty of care in a legal
malpractice action. Without hearing this evidence, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Carpenter.
The Hizeys appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude the expert
testimony, and the court of appeals certified the issue to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court for resolution. In Hizey v. Cai-penter,6 the state
supreme court unanimously upheld the trial judge's determination,
ruling that a plaintiff may not inform the jury of the existence of the
CPR or the RPC in a legal malpractice action, either directly through
jury instructions or by the testimony of experts.
This Note argues that the Hizey court erred by departing from the
majority of other jurisdictions and past Washington appellate deci-
sions admitting professional ethical standards as evidence in legal mal-
practice actions. Instead, the court should analyze the CPR and the
RPC on the same basis as statutes, ordinances, and administrative
rules in other actions for negligence. Part I examines the admissibility
of the CPR and the RPC in other jurisdictions as well as in Washing-
ton. Part II summarizes the issues and holding in Hizey. Part III
criticizes the Hizey decision on five separate grounds. Finally, Part IV
proposes an alternative to Hizey that would allow trial courts the same
discretion to admit professional ethical standards in legal malpractice
actions as in other actions for negligence. This alternative would elim-
inate the preferential double standard Hizey creates for lawyers as
defendants in legal malpractice actions.
I. PROFESSIONAL ETHICAL STANDARDS AS A
MEASURE OF AN ATTORNEY'S DUTY OF CARE
In an action for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must establish the
common law duty of care owed by the defendant attorney. Jurisdic-
tions other than Washington vary widely on the admissibility of pro-
fessional ethical standards as evidence of this duty of care and
consequently on the admissibility of professional etaical violations as
5. Id. Carpenter also objected on the ground that the expert, Professor David Boerner, was
not an expert in real estate law. Id.




evidence of a breach of the duty of care. Prior to Hizey, Washington
courts assumed, without explicitly deciding, that the CPR and the
RPC were admissible evidence in several extradisciplinary contexts,
including legal malpractice actions.
A. Establishing Legal Malpractice in Washington
Legal malpractice in Washington is a form of professional negli-
gence.7 To make out a prima facie case for legal malpractice, the
plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) an attorney-client relation-
ship, which gives rise to a duty of care owed by the attorney to the
client; (2) an act or omission by the attorney in breach of that duty of
care; (3) damage to the client; and (4) proximate causation between
the breach of the duty and the damage.' The attorney-client relation-
ship gives rise to the duty of care.9 Therefore, noncients can recover
from an attorney for legal malpractice only by showing that they were
the intended beneficiaries of the attorney's actions. 10 To conform to
the duty of care, an attorney must possess and exercise the degree of
care, skill, diligence, and knowledge commonly possessed and exer-
cised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in the State of
Washington."
In order to establish the appropriate duty of care, the plaintiff nor-
mally must present testimony by an expert witness. 12 The practice of
law is a highly technical field beyond the knowledge of the ordinary
layperson.' 3 Most lay jurors cannot determine without expert testi-
mony the degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge possessed by a
reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer. 4 Expert testimony therefore
is necessary unless the area of alleged malpractice lies within the com-
mon knowledge of laypersons. 5
7. See Bowman v. John Doe Two, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 185, 704 P.2d 140, 142 (1985) (holding
that once the plaintiff establishes an attorney-client relationship, the elements for legal
malpractice are the same as for negligence).
8. Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 260, 830 P.2d at 651.
9. Id.
10. See Bohn v. Cody, 119 Wash. 2d 357, 365, 832 P.2d 71, 75-76 (1992) (holding that
attorney liability extends beyond privity of contract only for third-party beneficiaries of an
attorney-client relationship and those who satisfy a multifactor balancing test that includes the
extent the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff).
11. Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 866-67 (1968).
12. See Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, 858, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1979).
13. Lynch v. Republic Publishing Co., 40 Wash. 2d 379, 389, 243 P.2d 636, 642 (1952).
14. See generally Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Use of Expert Witnesses
in Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1351 (1988).
15. Walker, 92 Wash. 2d at 858, 601 P.2d at 1282; see also Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash.
App. 78, 93, 538 P.2d 1238, 1249 (1975).
397
Washington Law Review Vol. 68:395, 1993
B. Use of the CPR and the RPC to Establish the Duty of Care
Professional ethical standards in the legal pro:Fession developed
independently from the common law duty of care. The Washington
Supreme Court adopted the CPR effective January 1, 197216 pursuant
to the court's exclusive, inherent power to admit, enroll, discipline,
and disbar attorneys. 17 The Preliminary Statement of the CPR pro-
vides that the CPR does not "undertake to define standards for civil
liability of lawyers for professional conduct."18 The supreme court
replaced the CPR with the R.PC effective September 1, 1985.19 When
adopting the RPC, however, the court declined to replace the CPR
Preliminary Statement with the Scope of the American Bar Associa-
tion Model RPC.
20
Courts take four different approaches to admitting professional ethi-
cal standards as evidence of an attorney's duty of care in legal mal-
practice actions. First, some courts hold that professional ethical
standards conclusively establish the duty of care and that any violation
constitutes negligence per se. Second, a minority of courts finds that a
professional ethical violation establishes a rebuttable presumption of
legal malpractice. Third, a large majority of courts treats professional
16. WASH. Cr. C.P.R., reprinted in 80 Wash. 2d 1119 (1972). The CPR consists of Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The Canons express in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers and embody the general concepts from
which the drafters derived the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. The Ethical
Considerations are aspirational in character. The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory and state
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action. Id. at 1121. The CPR superseded the 47 Canons of Professional Ethics that
had been in effect since 1950. See id. at 1119.
17. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 261, 830 P.2d 646, 652 (1992); see also Graham v.
Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 632, 548 P.2d 310, 315 (1976). In addition, the
State Bar Act requires that the standard of ethics for members of the Bar be the code of ethics of
the American Bar Association. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.230 (1992).
18. WASH. CT. C.P.R., Preliminary Statement, reprinted in 80 Wash. 2d 1119, 1122 (1972).
19. WASH. CT. R.P.C., reprinted in 104 Wash. 2d 1101 (1985).
20. The court instead retained portions of the CPR Preliminary Statement. Id. at 1105. The
Scope of the Model RPC provides in part:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed to provide
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of
the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply
that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement
of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extradisciplinary consequences of violating such a
duty.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983).
Professional Ethical Standards
ethical standards as evidence of the common law duty of care.
Finally, one court has found professional ethical standards inadmissi-
ble as evidence of an attorney's duty of care.
In California, courts hold professional ethical standards equivalent
to the duty of care that an attorney owes a client. In Ishmael v. Mil-
lington,21 the California District Court of Appeal found the common
law duty of care an inadequate measure of an attorney's duty in a legal
malpractice action where the plaintiff alleged that the attorney had
represented conflicting interests.22 Instead, the court held the defend-
ant attorney to the more specific professional ethical standards requir-
ing extensive disclosure.23 More recently, in Day v. Rosenthal,2"
another California appellate court held without further elaboration
that the California R.PC conclusively established the defendant attor-
ney's duty of care and explicitly equated violations to breaches of the
duty of care.
25
Most courts reject the theory that a violation of the CPR or the
RPC constitutes a breach of the common law duty of care. These
courts point out that disciplinary action remains the only direct rem-
edy for violations26 and that a violation does not give rise to a separate
cause of action.27
A small minority of courts holds that a professional ethical violation
establishes a rebuttable presumption of negligence. In Albright v.
Burns,2" a New Jersey appellate court held that the plaintiff's proof of
a violation provided a sufficient basis to shift the burden in a legal
malpractice action to the defendant attorney to disprove any impropri-
ety.29 The Albright court held that a failure to meet the minimum
21. 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
22. Id. at 597.
23. Id.
24. 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).
25. Id. at 102-04. Other courts state in dicta that a professional ethical violation may
constitute negligence per se. See, eg., Hatcher v. Roberts, 478 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (finding that the CPR provisions defined the defendant attorney's duty of care but
dismissing plaintiffs action for lack of proximate cause), review denied, 488 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1986);
Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Mont. 1987) (acknowledging that violation of some
disciplinary rules alone may constitute negligence, but not the rules cited by the plaintiff);
O'Toole v. Franklin, 569 P.2d 561, 566-67 (Or. 1977) (finding that violations of statutory
professional ethical standards may give rise to private rights of action independent of the
common law, but only intentional and deliberate, rather than negligent, violations).
26. See, e.g.. Terry Cove N., Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, P.C., 521 So. 2d 22, 23-24 (Ala.
1988); Palmer v. Westmeyer, 549 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
27. See, e.g., Brown v. Samalin & Bock, P.C., 547 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
28. 503 A.2d 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
29. Id. at 391. The Scope of the Model RPC expressly disavows the creation of such a
presumption. See supra note 20.
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standard of competence established by the RPC gives rise to an infer-
ence of malpractice." The Michigan Court of Appeals in Lipton v.
Boesky3 1 found the CPR analogous to criminal statutes and reasoned
that a wrongful act may offend a private individual as well as the gen-
eral public.32 By holding CPR violations to be rebuttable evidence of
malpractice, the court sought to enable clients to rely on the same
standards of professional conduct as those the CPR requires of attor-
neys in their relationships with the public, the legal system, and the
legal profession.33
A large majority of courts finds that a violation of the CPR or the
RPPC, while not establishing a rebuttable presumpt.on of negligence,
does constitute relevant evidence of a breach of an attorney's duty of
care.34 Several reasons persuade these courts to find professional ethi-
cal standards relevant. Some courts admit evidence of professional
ethical standards in both tort actions and disciplinary proceedings
because both contexts involve conduct failing to meet certain mini-
mum standards.35 Other courts admit the CPR and the RPC because
30. Aibright, 503 A.2d at 390-91.
31. 313 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
32. Id. at 166; accord Beattie v. Firnschild, 394 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
33. Lipton, 313 N.W.2d at 166-67 (citing Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276-79 (Mich.
1976), which held that violation of a penal statute creates a prima fheie case, or rebuttable
presumption, of negligence); accord Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D.
1985) (finding that a violation of the CPR constitutes rebuttable evidence of malpractice).
34. See, e.g., Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 352-53 (10th Cir. 1988);
Phillips v. Carson, 731 P.2d 820, 832 (Kan. 1987). Many courts refusing to hold that a
professional ethical violation constitutes negligence per se find instead that a violation constitutes
evidence of malpractice. See, eg., Williams v. Mordkofsky, 901 F.2d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 827-28 (N.D. 1988); Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone &
Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 403-07 (Tenn. 1991).
35. See, e.g., Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1371




they admit statutes and ordinances 36 or practice codes 37 to define the
duty of care in other actions for negligence.
38
Only one court prior to Hizey found professional ethical standards
inadmissible in a legal malpractice action. In Bross v. Denny,39 the
Missouri Court of Appeals held that two brief references to the CPR
made by the plaintiff's attorney did not constitute reversible error but
found such references generally inadmissible.' The court cited a pre-
vious Missouri decision that dismissed an action for malpractice based
exclusively on a CPR violation.41 However, the Bross court never
explained why the previous decision required exclusion of the CPR as
evidence of an attorney's duty of care.42
C. Use of Professional Ethical Standards in Washington
1. Use When Defining an Attorney's Common Law Duty of Care
Washington's intermediate appellate courts have used professional
ethical standards when defining an attorney's duty of care in actions
for legal malpractice on at least three occasions. However, these
courts assumed without further analysis that evidence of an ethical
violation was relevant and admissible in an action for legal malprac-
36. See, eg., Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 269 S.E.2d 426,430 (Ga. 1980); Mayol v. Summers,
Watson & Kimpel, 585 N.E.2d 1176, 1186 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 596 N.E.2d 630 (Ill.
1992); Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986).
37. See, eg., Waldman v. Levine, 544 A.2d 683, 691 (D.C. 1988). Washington courts as well
admit private practice codes as evidence of a common law duty of care. See, eg., Pedroza v.
Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 233-34, 677 P.2d 166, 170-71 (1984) (holding the accreditation
standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals relevant to a hospital's duty of
care); Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 630-41,453 P.2d
619, 621-27 (1969) (upholding admission of the American Standard Safety Code for Portable
Metal Ladders in an action for negligent design). The Nordstrom court explicitly overruled
Valley Land Office, Inc. v. O'Grady, 72 Wash. 2d 247, 253-54, 432 P.2d 850, 854 (1967), which
held a real estate broker's manual published by the Department of Licensing to be advisory
material not having the force of law and therefore inadmissible. Nordstrom, 75 Wash. 2d at 641,
453 P.2d at 627.
38. Commentators advance at least two additional reasons for admitting professional ethical
standards as evidence of an attorney's duty of care. See, eg., Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of
Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV.
281 (1979). First, the Preliminary Statement accords the CPR a neutral rather than hostile
standing, never indicating that it would be inappropriate for a court to examine the CPR for
guidance in civil actions. Id. at 287. Second, courts can achieve a more acceptable level of
attorney compliance with the CPR by admitting it as evidence in legal malpractice actions. Id. at
286-95.
39. 791 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
40. Id. at 420.
41. Id. (citing Greening v. Klamen, 652 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
42. Id. The Greening court acknowledged that courts frequently look to the CPR in order to
determine an attorney's duty of care. Greening, 652 S.W.2d at 734.
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tice.43 In Hamilton v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 4
the court approved the use of the Canons of Professional Ethics in
both expert testimony and jury instructions as evidence of the duty of
care owed by an insurer's attorney to both the insurer and the
insured.45 The Hamilton court relied on the Washington Supreme
Court's invocation of Canon 6 as the proper duty of care owed by an
attorney with conflicting interests in an earlier insurance case.46 In
Kelly v. Foster,47 the court affirmed a trial judge's disposition of a legal
malpractice action alleging attorney conflict of interest where the jury
instructions incorporated provisions of the CPR.48
One Washington court balanced two competing CPR provisions to
determine an attorney's duty of care in Hawkins v. King County,4 9 a
legal malpractice action against a court-appointed defense attorney.
The Hawkins court weighed the plaintiff's claim that the defendant
attorney had violated a Disciplinary Rule requiring disclosure of
material information5' against the attorney's duty of zealous advo-
cacy.5 1 The court ultimately found that the duty of zealous advocacy
overrode the duty to disclose and upheld summary judgment for the
defendant. 2
2. Use Other Than When Defining an Attorney's Common Law
Duty of Care
Washington courts have also invoked professional ethical standards
on many occasions other than when defining an attorney's duty of care
in legal malpractice actions. Four months prior to Hizey, the Wash-
43. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 265, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (1992).
44. 9 Wash. App. 180, 511 P.2d 1020 (1973), aft'd, 83 Wash. 2d 737, 523 P.2d 193 (1974).
45. The plaintiffs called two expert witnesses who expressly testified that Canon 8 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics defined the defendant attorney's duty of care in the conduct of a
client's litigation. Id. at 182, 511 P.2d at 1022. The Canons were in effect at the time of the
attorney's actions. Id.; see supra note 16.
46. Hamilton, 9 Wash. App. at 186, 511 P.2d at 1024 (citing Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d
601, 612, 349 P.2d 430, 437 (1960)).
47. 62 Wash. App. 150, 813 P.2d 598, review denied, 118 Wash. 2d 1001, 822 P.2d 287
(1991).
48. Id at 153, 813 P.2d at 600. The complete report of the proceedings was not before the
court. The court ruled only on whether the plaintiff could recover attorney fees. Id. at 151 n.1,
813 P.2d at 599 n.1.
49. 24 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979).
50. Id. at 342-43, 602 P.2d at 364-65 (Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3)).
51. Id. at 341-43, 602 P.2d at 364-65 (Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(1)).
52. Id. at 343, 602 P.2d at 365. The Hawkins court did indicate that a Disciplinary Rule
created no legal duty to disclose and stated that a theory of liability based exclusively on an




ington Supreme Court decided in Eriks v. Denver5" that an attorney
who violated the conflict of interest provisions of the CPR breached
his fiduciary duty to his clients as a matter of law. 4 The court
ordered the defendant to disgorge his fees as a means of attorney disci-
pline, distinguishing an action for disgorgement based on a breach of
fiduciary duty from an action for malpractice.5 The most common
use of the CPR in an extradisciplinary context has been to determine
the reasonableness of attorney fees. 6 Washington courts also have
referred to professional ethical standards in order to disqualify attor-
neys5 7 and to regulate the terms of the sale of a law practice. 8 Courts
have even applied the CPR to nonattorneys 9
II. HIZEY v. CARPENTER
The Washington Supreme Court found its first opportunity to rule
explicitly on the propriety of admitting professional ethical standards
as evidence of an attorney's common law duty of care in Hizey. The
court ruled all such evidence inadmissible, expressly rejecting both the
negligence per se approach and the more common evidence-of-negli-
gence approachY°
The Hizey court followed the majority of courts when it found that
an ethical violation does not constitute negligence per se for two rea-
sons. First, the court cited the Preliminary Statement of the CPR,
which disavows any undertaking to define standards for civil liabil-
ity.61 This clear and unambiguous language, the court stated, pre-
cludes any violation from conclusively establishing a cause of action
for malpractice.62 Second, the court pointed out that the breach of a
53. 118 Wash. 2d 451, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992).
54. Id. at 459-60, 824 P.2d at 1211-12.
55. Id. at 463, 824 P.2d at 1213. The court held as a matter of law that a conflict of interest
prevented the defendant from adequately representing his clients. Id. at 462, 824 P.2d at 1213.
The trial judge reserved the issue of legal malpractice for another phase of the trial. Id.
56. See, eg., Allard v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 112 Wash. 2d 145, 149-50, 768 P.2d 998,
1000, modified, 773 P.2d 420 (1989); McNeary v. American Cyanamid Co., 105 Wash. 2d 136,
142-44, 712 P.2d 845, 848-49 (1986).
57. See, eg., State v. Stenger, 111 Wash. 2d 516, 520, 760 P.2d 357, 359 (1988); First Small
Business Inv. Co. v. Intercapital Corp., 108 Wash. 2d 324, 329-30, 738 P.2d 263, 266 (1987).
58. Walsh v. Brousseau, 62 Wash. App. 739, 742-43, 815 P.2d 828, 831 (1991).
59. In Bowers v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 589-90, 675 P.2d 193,
199-200 (1983), the court found that a lay escrow agent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law had a conflict of interest in violation of Disciplinary Rule 5-105.
60. The Hizey court did not explicitly address the approach that holds an ethical violation to
be a rebuttable presumption of negligence.
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
62. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 258-59, 830 P.2d 646, 650-51 (1992).
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professional ethical standard provides only a public, disciplinary
remedy.63
However, the Hizey court departed from the majority of jurisdic-
tions, which admits professional ethical standards as evidence of an
attorney's common law duty of care.64 The court cited four reasons
for denying admission of the CPR and the RPC in legal malpractice
actions. First, the court rejected the analogy between professional eth-
ical standards and statutes, because the state supreme court, rather
than the legislature, adopted the CPR and the RPC.65 Second, the
court found the CPR and the RPC too vague to establish the duty of
care, because they constitute only a minimum level of conduct.6 6
Third, the court found that a plaintiff's use of the CPR and the RPC
in a malpractice action would upset the balance in the legal system,
emphasizing the attorney-client relationship at the expense of the
courts and public.67 Finally, the court found that adequate common
law theories exist for redressing private injury, inciuding actions for
negligence, breach of contract, and fraud.6" The court specifically
asserted its receptivity to providing recovery under the Consumer Pro-
tection Act.69 The court concluded from these reasons that testimony
regarding professional ethical standards was "a makeweight capable
only of misdirecting the jury."7
III. CRITIQUE OF HIZEY
The Hizey court improperly singled out legal malpractice as the one
extradisciplinary context in which professional ethical standards con-
stitute inadmissible evidence. The court's decision is flawed in five
respects. First, neither the language of the CPR and the RPC nor the
63. Id. at 259, 830 P.2d at 651.
64. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
65. Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 261, 830 P.2d at 652.
66. Id. at 261-62, 830 P.2d at 652.
67. Id at 263, 830 P.2d at 653.
68. Id at 263-64, 830 P.2d at 653.
69. Id at 264, 830 P.2d at 653. The Consumer Protection Act provides that "[u]nfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful." WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86,020 (1992). Any person
injured in his or her business or property by a violation of the Consumer Protection Act may
bring a civil action to recover treble damages and attorney's fees. Id § 19.86.090. In Short v.
Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 65-66, 691 P.2d 163, 170 (1984), -.he court held that the
entrepreneurial aspects of law practice are "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the
Consumer Protection Act. Prior to Short, no precedent existed to establish that the legal
profession is involved in trade or commerce. See Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash. 2d 331, 338,
544 P.2d 88, 92 (1976).
70. Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 264, 830 P.2d at 653.
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court's past decisions justify finding inadmissibility. Second, the court
erred in analyzing the evidentiary attributes of the CPR and the RPC
differently from those of statutes. Third, the court created an unwork-
able standard of admissibility for the trial courts, threatening their
ability to produce just results. Fourth, by excluding professional ethi-
cal standards from actions for legal malpractice, the court subverted
their beneficial and educational effects, artificially arresting the devel-
opment of the common law duty of care. Finally, the court created a
double standard that favors attorneys in legal malpractice actions over
laypersons in other actions for negligence.
A. The CPR and the RPC Do Not Require Finding Inadmissibility
The Hizey court misread the language of the Preliminary Statement
as precluding the admissibility of professional ethical standards as rel-
evant evidence of an attorney's common law duty of care. The lan-
guage of the Preliminary Statement does not compel this result. The
Preliminary Statement asserts that the CPR does not "undertake to
define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional con-
duct."7 The word "undertake" connotes more than the meaning of
"attempt" or "engage in." It implies a greater burden amounting to a
guarantee or an obligation. 72 In the Preliminary Statement, the draft-
ers of the CPR merely refused to guarantee that the CPR would define
conclusively any standards of civil liability.73
The drafters of the RPC never intended to prohibit every extradis-
ciplinary introduction of the CPR and the RPC into the courtroom.
By the time the drafters promulgated the Scope of the Model RPC,74
several courts had held the CPR admissible as relevant evidence of an
attorney's duty of care.75 In addition, influential commentators had
argued that courts should accord the CPR a position of neutrality
rather than hostility in civil actions. 6 While the drafters of the RPC
disavowed any intent to alter the common law duty of care and had
71. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (6th ed. 1990).
73. Most courts do not find that this absence of guarantee renders the CPR irrelevant in
determining an attorney's duty of care in a legal malpractice action. See supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the Hizey court neglected entirely to consider its ability to
admit the CPR irrespective of the drafters' intent. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. The Washington Supreme Court declined
to replace the Preliminary Statement with the more restrictive Scope when the court adopted the
RPC. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 38.
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the opportunity to prohibit expressly any introduction of the RPC as
evidence of such, they declined to do so.7 7
The Hizeys' use of the CPR and the RPC fit within the drafters'
intent. The Scope of the Model RPC more explicitly indicates the
drafters' intent when declining to guarantee standards of civil liability.
The Scope provides that a violation of the RPC should not give rise to
a cause of action by creating a duty that otherwise would not exist.78
In other words, the drafters intended to prevent a violation from giv-
ing rise to a cause of action not resulting from an attorney-client rela-
tionship.7 9 The Hizeys did not invoke the CPR and the RPC to create
such an independent cause of action. Rather, they attempted to
explain to the jury the elusive concept of an attorney's duty of care.
Even if the expert witness had referred to professional ethical stan-
dards to establish that duty of care, the Hizeys still would have needed
to prove the existence of the attorney-client relationship giving rise to
the duty, proximate causation, and damages.80 The Hizeys sought
only to inform the jury of the existence of professional ethical stan-
dards to which the ordinary lawyer of reasonable prudence should
refer in exercising professional judgment.
Furthermore, despite its fastidiousness with respect to the admissi-
bility of professional ethical standards in legal malpractice actions, the
Washington Supreme Court has admitted the CPR and the RPC in
many other extradisciplinary contexts.8" The court in the Hizey opin-
ion itself expressly approved the admissibility of the CPR and the
RPC in civil actions against attorneys other than malpractice.82 The
77. See supra note 20.
78. See supra note 20.
79. Many courts hold that a professional ethical violation cannot create a cause of action for a
third party. See, eg., Hashemi v. Shack, 609 F. Supp. 391, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Mozzochi v.
Beck, 529 A.2d 171, 174-76 (Conn. 1987); Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 201 (Wyo. 1990). The
most common example occurs in a physician's action for malicious prosecution following the
successful defense of a claim for medical malpractice. Courts unanimously reject the physician's
introduction of the adversary attorney's professional ethical violations as a breach of the duty of
care, holding that professional ethical standards do not create such a duty in the absence of an
attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 378-79 (10th Cir. 1979);
Nelson v. Miller, 607 P.2d 438, 449-51 (Kan. 1980); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112-13
(Va. 1980). For a good discussion on the distinction between the use of the CPR to create a duty
to a nonclient and its use to further traditional common law malpractice actions, see Michael J.
Benjamin, Comment, The Rules of Professional Conduct: Basis for Civil Liability of Attorneys, 39
U. FLA. L. REv. 777 (1987).
80. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
82. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 264, 830 P.2d 646, 653-54 (1992). One
Washington court conceded that by upholding the RPC in contexts other than disciplinary




court also has applied the CPR to laypersons, despite explicit language
in the Preliminary Statement disclaiming any such applicability.83 In
short, the Hizey court singled out legal malpractice as the one context
in which it prohibits evidence of professional ethical violations.84
Neither the standards themselves nor the court's past use of them jus-
tifies this narrow exception.
B. The Hizey Court Improperly Rejected the Analogy Between
Professional Ethical Standards and Statutes
The Hizey court improperly dismissed the analogy between profes-
sional ethical standards and statutes. Two theories justify admitting
statutes as evidence of the duty of care in a civil action for negligence.
Both theories apply to professional ethical standards as well.85 Ignor-
ing the applicability of these theories, the Hizey court improperly criti-
cized the CPR and the RPC as unduly vague and unusually prone to
upsetting the balance in the legal system among attorneys, clients, the
court, and the public. The court should not have distinguished
between ethical and statutory standards as admissible evidence in a
legal malpractice action.
The first theory for admitting statutes states that the ordinary per-
son of reasonable prudence obeys the law.86 While this holds true only
theoretically for all statutes,87 the CPR and the RPC explicitly estab-
lish the minimum standards for conduct by a professional attorney.88
The ordinary lawyer exercising reasonable prudence adheres to profes-
sional ethical standards, because violations constitute grounds for dis-
cipline. Courts should, therefore, treat professional ethical violations
as evidence of a breach of the duty of care.
The second theory for extending statutory standards to civil actions
states that the court should defer to the legislature's indication of the
proper duty of care and thereby further democratically expressed poli-
lawyers. Copp v. Breskin, 56 Wash. App. 229, 232, 782 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1989), review denied,
114 Wash. 2d 1026, 793 P.2d 974 (1990).
83. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The Preliminary Statement provides in part,
"Obviously the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules cannot apply to non-
lawyers .... " WASH. CT. C.P.R., Preliminary Statement, reprinted in 80 Wash. 2d 1119, 1121
(1972).
84. Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 266, 830 P.2d at 654.
85. For courts that embrace the statutory analogy, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
86. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at
221 (5th ed. 1984).
87. See id.
88. See supra note 16.
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cies.8 9 This applies to professional ethical standards as well.
Although the Hizey court maintained that the legislature had no role
in adopting the CPR and the RPC,90 the Washington legislature has
decided specifically that the standards of the American Bar Associa-
tion should govern attorney ethics.9 ' Admitting evidence of ethical
violations in legal malpractice actions would further the policy of the
legislature by ensuring greater conformity with the professional ethical
standards adopted by the court with its express approval.
The Hizey court improperly dismissed the analogy between ethical
and statutory standards, diminishing the impact of its subsequent criti-
cisms of the CPR and the RPC. Many statutes, ordinances, and
administrative rules as well as professional ethical standards constitute
only the minimum level of conduct and provide only a public rem-
edy.92 Moreover, the CPR and the RPC may actually be less vague
than many statutes. 93 The Washington Supreme Court finds profes-
sional ethical standards sufficiently precise that a violation may sup-
port disbarment.9 * Finally, attorneys may invoke their compliance
with professional ethical standards antithetical to clients' interests in
defending against malpractice liability, having every incentive to intro-
duce evidence emphasizing the balance among attorneys, clients, the
court, and the public.95 By ignoring these attributes, the Hizey court
erred in drawing an artificial and unsupported distinction between
statutes and professional ethical standards.
C. Hizey Creates Unworkable Standards for Trial Courts
As it rushed to proscribe every mention of professional ethical stan-
dards in legal malpractice actions, the Hizey court created insoluble
dilemmas for trial judges, seriously threatening the ability of the
courts to render just verdicts. A plaintiff normally must define the
89. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 86, § 36, at 222.
90. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 17.
92. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 86, § 36, at 233 (contending that a statutory standard
constitutes no more than a minimum); id. at 220 (contending that statutes, ordinances, and
administrative rules usually are penal in character and carry only criminal penalties).
93. California courts employ professional ethical standards precisely because they are less
vague than the general duty of care by which the court traditionally requires juries to assess
professional negligence. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
94. See, eg., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Johnson, 114 Wash. 2d 737, 748, 790
P.2d 1227, 1232 (1990) (holding that an attorney's failure to preserve the integrity of client funds
in violation of RTC 1.14 ordinarily leads to disbarment). The United States Supreme Court
considers disbarment proceedings to be quasi-criminal in nature. In rz Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
551 (1968).




defendant attorney's duty of care by means of expert testimony.96
When forming an opinion, an expert may rely on evidence that would
not be admissible at trial.9 7 However, an opponent may require the
expert to disclose on cross-examination the factual basis underlying
the opinion. 98 Thus, the plaintiff's expert, when testifying that an
attorney breached the duty of care, may rely on the fact that the attor-
ney violated a professional ethical standard.99 Furthermore, the
expert may introduce into testimony learned treatises which them-
selves are based at least in part on the CPR and the RPC.1°° But
under Hizey, the expert may not disclose any such reliance on cross-
examination. 101
When defense counsel questions the basis for the expert's opinion,
the trial judge faces the Scylla of Evidence Rule 705102 and the Cha-
rybdis of Hizey. The trial judge must consider whether defense coun-
sel has opened the door by inquiring into the expert's basis. 103 If so,
then Hizey has no practical effect whatsoever, as the expert is free to
disclose the professional ethical standards underlying the opinion.
Defense counsel faces the dilemma of opening the door or allowing the
expert's opinion to go unchallenged. If the trial judge determines that
Hizey precludes any such opening of the door, then the trial deterio-
rates into a battle of experts, all of whom must maintain the absurd
fiction that their opinions are valid, yet not based on any extrinsic
standards such as the CPR and the RPC. Finally, the plaintiff ordina-
rily should be able to inquire into specific instances of a witness's con-
duct on cross-examination for the purpose of attacking credibility.1"
If the trial judge, relying on Hizey, strictly refuses to admit any refer-
ence to the CPR or the RPC, the resulting litigation will not reliably
produce just results. 105
96. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
97. WASH. R. EvID. 703.
98. WASH. R. EVID. 705.
99. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 265, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (1992).
100. See WASH. R. EVID. 803(a)(18).
101. "[I]n a legal malpractice action ... the jury may not be informed of the CPR or the
RPC, either directly through jury instructions or through the testimony of an expert who refers
to the CPR or the RPC." Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 266, 830 P.2d at 654.
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. Washington courts generally admit otherwise inadmissible evidence when the objecting
party first opens the door. State v. Tarman, 27 Wash. App. 645, 651 n.4, 621 P.2d 737, 741 n.4
(1980).
104. WASH. R. EVID. 608(b).
105. The Hizeys said after the trial that confused jurors had told them, "We're sorry .... We
felt [Carpenter] hadn't treated you people right, but we didn't know what to do." Peter Lewis,
Two Kinds of Justice? Whidbey Island Couple Think So-Lawyers' Ethics Code Can't Be Used in
Suit, SEATrLE TIMES, July 29, 1992, at Al.
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D. Hizey Erects an Artificial Barrier Between Ethics and
Malpractice
By foreclosing any mention of the CPR and the FPC in actions for
legal malpractice, the Hizey court diminished the positive effect of pro-
fessional ethical standards on attorney conduct. The court has
insisted that professional ethical standards do not affect the common
law duty of care, 106 and the drafters disavowed any intent to do so.w7
Nevertheless, the CPR has had a significant influence on the conduct
that the public expects from attorneys.10 8 For example, the CPR more
precisely defines the duty of care with respect to conflicts of interest
and prohibits multiple representation that once comported with the
common law duty of care. 109 In addition, effective lawyer discipline in
Washington depends upon both the threat of malpractice actions as
well as all too infrequent formal disciplinary proceedings. 110 The
Hizey court precluded any further beneficial deterrent or educational
impact of the CPR and the RPC by jealously preserving its exclusive
monopoly on their use. The court should not have artificially arrested
the development of the common law duty of care.
E. Hizey Creates a Preferential Double Standard Jbr Attorneys
By refusing to admit the professional ethical standards of attorneys,
the Hizey court established that lawyers in Washington play by differ-
ent rules than laypersons. The court refused to admit as evidence
mandatory professional ethical standards despite having admitted the
standards of other professions as evidence of a common law duty of
106. Bush v. O'Connor, 58 Wash. App. 138, 147-48, 791 P.2d 915, 920, review denied, 115
Wash. 2d 1020, 802 P.2d 125 (1990).
107. See supra note 20.
108. The Preliminary Statement provides that the CPR "define[s the type of ethical conduct
that the public has a right to expect" of lawyers. WASH. CT. C.P.R., Preliminary Statement,
reprinted in 80 Wash. 2d 1119, 1121 (1972).
109. See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 12.1, at
701-02 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992).
110. In 1989, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Washington State Bar Association
reported receiving 1870 complaints, or 14 complaints per 100 active in-state lawyers. Of these,
59 resulted in the discipline of 17 lawyers, or 0.13% of the active in-state lawyers. This was the
lowest percentage recorded since the Bar began reporting such statistic in 1981. The fact that
the Bar stays any disciplinary investigation pending resolution of civil suits indicates how heavily
the Bar relies on private malpractice actions to enforce professional ethical standards. See
Leland G. Ripley, Enforcing the Rules Through the Disciplinary Process: How the System Works,
in SECOND ANNUAL PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INSTITUTE: ENFORCING PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 1 (Washington Law School Foundation 1990). Commentators argue as well that courts
can enhance attorney compliance with professional ethical standards by admitting them as




care.11 In addition, the court reinforced the special treatment lawyers
receive under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The Hizey court
maintained that it has been open to new theories of attorney liabil-
ity, 12 but the CPA covers only the entrepreneurial aspects of the legal
profession."I The CPA provides no remedy at all in claims for negli-
gence and legal malpractice." 4 Ironically, the court held previously
that the unauthorized practice of law does constitute a violation of the
CPA. 1 5 Thus, the plaintiff in an action for negligence against a
layperson engaged in the unauthorized practice of law may introduce
violations of the CPR and the RPC 16 and request treble damages
under the CPA. 7 The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may
neither refer to professional ethical standards 8 nor seek recovery
under the CPA. 9 The court should not have created a preferential
double standard for attorney misconduct.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO HIZEY
The Hizey court improperly rejected the analogy between profes-
sional ethical standards and statutes, finding the former inadmissible
as evidence of an attorney's common law duty of care and creating a
separate standard for attorneys in legal malpractice actions. The court
instead should allow trial courts to analyze the CPR and the RPC
using the Tort Reform Act and the law of evidence to determine the
applicability of the CPR and the RPC in each case. By taking this
approach, the court would avoid creating a preferential double stan-
dard for attorneys, ensuring fairer trials for plaintiffs in legal malprac-
tice actions.
The court should admit professional ethical standards in legal mal-
practice actions on the same basis as other statutes in an action for
I 11. See supra note 37.
112. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 69.
114. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 66, 691 P.2d 163, 170 (1984). The Short court
acknowledged the important public policy interests at stake in refusing to extend the CPA to
cover legal malpractice and thereby denying injured clients a complete remedy. Id. at 62, 691
P.2d at 168-69. In contrast, the Hizey court characterized the limited relief extended by Short as
an expansive receptivity to additional theories of recovery. See supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
115. Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 592-93, 675 P.2d 193, 201
(1983). The Bowers court also held that the CPR governs laypersons engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 69, 115, and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 101.
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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negligence. Washington's Tort Reform Act provides explicitly that
the trier of fact may consider a violation of a statute, ordinance, or
administrative rule as evidence of negligence.120 The court must
determine that the statute, ordinance, or administrative rule is for the
benefit or protection of the person injured or addressed to the particu-
lar harm suffered before it admits evidence of a violation. 121 Applying
this approach to legal malpractice, a form of negligence, 122 a trial
court would determine the applicability of professional ethical stan-
dards in the unique context of each case.1 23 When deciding whether
specific CPR and RPC provisions exist for the benefit of the plain-
tiff,124 the court would distinguish between actions fbr malpractice by
clients and those by third parties who have failed to establish an attor-
ney-client relationship.'25 These well established procedures would
ensure that the trial court admitted evidence of professional ethical
standards only when justified by the facts of each case.
After finding the CPR or the RPC relevant, the trial court then
would apply the Rules of Evidence to determine the admissibility of
the specific provisions at trial. The trial court would decide whether
the danger of misleading the jury substantially outweighs the proba-
tive value of evidence of a violation. 126 The defendant would bear the
burden of making this showing, 127 and the appellate courts could
reverse the determination only when the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion. 12  In addition, the trial court would have its traditional dis-
cretion in admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence when an expert
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.050 (1992). The Tort Reform Act provides in part, "A
breach of a duty imposed by statute, ordinance, or administrative rule shall not be considered
negligence per se, but may be considered by the trier of fact as evidence of negligence .. . ." Id.
121. WASHINGTON PATaERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL 60.03, at 439 (3d ed. 1989).
122. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
123. One commentator asserts that because the CPR places an extremely diverse nature of
duties and standards on lawyers, the court should evaluate each provision to determine whether
a violation creates a cause of action. Robert Dahlquist, The Code of PAofessional Responsibility
and Civil Damage Actions Against Attorneys, 9 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1982); see also KEETON
ET AL., supra note 86, § 36, at 231 (contending that the arbitrary classification of all breaches of
statutes as no negligence at all leaves too little flexibility to formulate a duty of care).
124. See, e.g., Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 461, 824 P.2d 1207, 1212 (1992) (finding
that an attorney violated a Disciplinary Rule governing conflicts of interest with respect to his
investor clients).
125. For a discussion regarding establishing an attorney-client relationship in Washington,
see supra note 10 and accompanying text. Many courts hold that a profrssional ethical violation
cannot give rise to a cause of action by a third party. See supra note 79.
126. WASH. R. EVID. 403.
127. 5 KARL B. TEGLAND, EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 105, at 346 (3d ed. 1989).




testifies to the factual basis underlying an opinion,12 9 when testimony
takes the form of a learned treatise, 130 and when a plaintiff seeks to
attack the defendant's credibility.
131
On the facts of Hizey, the trial court likely would have admitted
expert testimony on the CPR and the RPC as probative of Carpenter's
common law duty of care. First, under the Tort Reform Act, the
Hizeys would have demonstrated their status as intended beneficiaries
of the CPR and the RPC by establishing their attorney-client relation-
ship. 132 Second, under the law of evidence, Carpenter would have
borne the burden of proving that any possible confusion of the jury
substantially outweighed the probative value of the specific CPR and
RPC provisions governing conflicts of interest.1 33 Evidence Rule 403
traditionally has vested the court with discretion to eliminate distract-
ing side issues.1 34 In Hizey, the professional ethical standards to which
the plaintiff's expert would have testified were not side issues but
rather central to defining the applicable duty of care. The Hizeys'
expert witness should have been free to testify that in formulating Car-
penter's particular duty of care he had taken into consideration perti-
nent provisions of the CPR and the RPC. By eliminating the double
standard protecting attorneys who injure clients when violating pro-
fessional ethical standards, the Hizey court could have ensured a fairer
trial.
V. CONCLUSION
The Hizey court erred by departing from the majority of courts and
past Washington decisions and singling out legal malpractice as the
one context in which professional ethical standards are inadmissible.
In so doing, the court created an unworkable standard for trial courts
and subverted the beneficial deterrent effects of the CPR and the RPC.
The court instead should admit the CPR and the RPC on the same
basis as statutes, ordinances, and administrative rules in actions for
negligence. By analyzing professional ethical standards under the well
129. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
132. The Washington Supreme Court already has ruled that an attorney may violate the
conflict-of-interest provisions of the CPR with respect to clients. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. By holding testimony on the CPR and
the RPC to be "a makeweight capable only of misdirecting the jury," see supra note 69 and
accompanying text, the Hizey court in effect based its decision on Evidence Rule 403 without
observing the procedural safeguards inherent in the proper application of the Rules of Evidence.
134. 5 TEGLAND, supra note 127, § 106, at 352-53.
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established guidelines of the Tort Reform Act awid evidence law,
courts would avoid creating a preferential double standard for lawyers
in legal malpractice actions and ensure fairer trials.
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